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ABSTRACT 
 
Technological progress is crucial for economic growth and enhancement of standard of living in 
any economy.  But firms often have insufficient incentive for R&D, because in spite of patent 
protection, the benefits of R&D are not always limited to the firms that initially conduct the R&D 
activities.  Consequently, governments around the world often undertake industrial policies to 
promote collaborative R&D efforts between firms in order to increase R&D.  This paper examines 
the implications of cooperative R&D agreements for the societal well being.  The R&D and price 
decisions are analyzed using a Bertrand Duopoly Model in presence of product differentiation in 
a two-stage game.  It is shown that under cooperative R&D agreements R&D and output levels 
are larger and prices are lower than under non-cooperation.  For complementary and 
independent goods, these results are valid for any degree of R&D spillover and for substitute 
goods they may hold even for sufficiently small R&D spillover.  These results are more general 
than D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) who have shown that cooperative R&D levels exceed 
those under non-cooperation only for large R&D spillover.  As for the level of social welfare, this 
paper finds the cooperative as well as the non-cooperative R&D output and price levels to be 
socially inefficient. However, cooperative R&D agreements tend to dominate non-cooperative 
R&D ventures in terms of social welfare.  This result also holds for any degree of R&D spillover 
for complementary and independent goods and even for sufficiently small spillover in the case of 
substitute goods. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
mportance of R&D efforts for the growing prosperity of a firm and an industry as well as for the 
aggregate economic growth can hardly be overstated.  For the U.S., some econometric studies have 
established the "direct returns" to R&D (accruing to the firm or the industry undertaking the R&D 
activities) to be at par with returns to other investment.  Still there may be insufficient incentive on the part of the 
firms to engage in R&D activities.  In the U.S., for example, only 2 to 3% of GDP is invested in R&D.
1
  This lack of 
private incentive lies in the partial non-excludability of the outcome of R&D.  The benefits of R&D are not always 
limited to the firms that initially conduct the R&D activities.  Frequently, a research yields a scientific knowledge 
whose potential uses may well surpass the applications of the specific firms.  Furthermore, as Tyson (1990) notes, 
"Often, even with effective patent protection, competitors are able to copy or reverse - engineer a private 
innovation." 
 
Such partial non-excludability of R&D outcomes generates technological spillovers.  These spillover 
benefits are not limited to specific industries where R&D efforts are originally undertaken but spread across industry 
boundaries.  Consequently, firms may lack incentive to engage in R&D activities since they do not receive any 
payment by other firms that benefit from their R&D and nor can they often prevent other firms from using the 
knowledge generated by their R&D. 
 
                                                 
1 See Grossman and Helpman (1991) and the Congressional Budget Office report (2005) for detailed discussions. 
I 
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In view of the importance of R&D activities, it is not surprising that public policies may be designed to 
restore the private incentive for R&D efforts.  Encouragement of cooperative R&D ventures between firms (as in 
Japan and Europe) and consequent liberalization of anti-trust measures are frequently advocated.  In the U.S. the 
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 is also designed to encourage firms to undertake cooperative R&D 
ventures. As Schacht (2012) notes: “The government has supported various efforts to promote cooperative research 
and development activities …designed to increase the competitiveness of American industry and to encourage the 
generation of new products, processes, and services.” 
 
However, the case for cooperative R&D ventures in restoring the private incentive for R&D may not be 
very straightforward.  It has been argued, for example, that cooperative R&D agreements between firms may 
actually lead to a reduction in R&D levels by eliminating wasteful duplication of efforts (Katz (1986).  Considering 
a Cournot duopoly producing a homogeneous good, where the cost-reducing R&D projects of one firm bring about 
cost reduction for the other firm, D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) have, however, shown, inter alia, for large 
R&D spillover cooperative R&D agreements indeed lead to larger R&D levels.  They have also demonstrated that 
both cooperative and non-cooperative R&D levels are `socially inefficient’. 
 
Since R&D cooperation can take place between firms across many different industries, it is particularly 
important to analyze cooperative (and non-cooperative) R&D agreements between firms in presence of product 
differentiation; i.e., when the outputs of the firms may be substitutes, complements or independent goods.  As 
Kodama (1992) points out, “…collective research in Japan is beginning to bring together companies from different 
industries rather than different companies within the same industry.”  Kodama further notes that, in Japan, “In 1988, 
for instance, there were 27 cases of collective research in which just 1 of the 5 rival computer makers – Toshiba, 
Hitachi, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi, and NEC – took part with other industries;…  Earlier in the decade, a typical joint 
research project would have included all 5-computer makers working together on an industry-specific problem.  The 
same diversification trend is observable in other industries” as well. 
 
In this paper cooperative and non-cooperative R&D efforts are viewed as strategic investments for 
“Bertrand” firms that compete by setting prices.  Specifically, the behaviors of the firms are analyzed using a two-
stage game.  In the first stage, firms choose their own R&D levels.  In the second stage firms choose the price levels.  
Taking the R&D levels as given, we first determine the Nash equilibrium in the second stage.  Using the second 
stage solution the profits of the preceding stage are expressed in terms of the R&D levels.  A Nash equilibrium for 
the first stage is then determined.  This gives rise to a subgame perfect equilibrium in the two-stage game.  In this 
paper such subgame perfect equilibrium under cooperative and non-cooperative R&D agreements, are characterized. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we determine the strategic cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibrium R&D, output and price levels.  It is shown that the R&D and output levels are larger and the 
prices are lower under R&D cooperation than under non-cooperation.  For complementary and independent goods, 
these results are valid for any degree of R&D spillover and may hold even for sufficiently small R&D spillover with 
substitute goods. Turning to the welfare implications of R&D cooperation in Section 3, we show that cooperative as 
well as non-cooperative levels of R&D, outputs and prices are socially inefficient.  However, in terms of social 
welfare the cooperative R&D agreements dominate the non-cooperative arrangements. 
 
2. R&D COOPERATION AND NONCOOPERATION IN DIFFERENTIATED BERTRAND 
DUOPOLY 
 
Consider an industry with two firms producing differentiated goods.  In order to obtain closed form 
solutions, we consider the following parameterization of the inverse demand function for the i
th
 firm: 
 
i i jp x x , 0 i, j 1,2 i j           (1) 
 
ix  denotes the level of output produced by the i
th
 firm and ip  the corresponding price. 
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0


  according as the goods are substitutes, independent or complements. It is further assumed2 that 
 .  The assumed symmetry of the demand functions adds to computational simplicity without sacrificing 
generality.  This demand structure, except for the assumed symmetry, is used by Dixit (1979), Singh and Vives 
(1985) among others.  Shubik and Levitan (1980) use a slightly different symmetric model.
3
 We assume that firms 
behave as Bertrand duopolists and compete with each other by setting prices.  The direct demand function 
corresponding to the above inverse demand function is given by: 
 
i i jx a bp cp i, j 1, 2, i j    
 (2) 
where: 
 
a  0,


  
 
2 2 2 2
b 0,c
 
  
     
 
 
>
<
c  0= , according as the goods are substitutes, independent or complements.  Also, we make the 
reasonable assumption that the direct effect of a price change on demand is stronger than the cross effect; i.e., 
|c>|b , which also follows from  . 
 
As in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, we assume a linear cost structure: 
 
                                                                         (3) 
 
Firm i’s R&D activity lowers its unit cost of production.  But as postulated by Hartwick (1984), firm i can 
also imitate the invention of firm j at a cost lower than what would be required to spend in order to invent the new 
process by itself.  Thus firm j’s R&D activity also lowers the unit cost of production for firm i.    measures the 
extent of such R&D spillover from one firm to the other.  The direct cost of R&D for the i
th
 firm is given by: 
 
2
i
i i
y
g (y ) ,
2

     0,   i 1,2.  (4) 
 
The profit function for the i
th
 Bertrand duopolist can now be written as: 
 
2
i
i i j i i ji j
y
 = [a - + ]  - [ - - ][a - + ] -    i, j = 1,2  i jy ybp cp p bp cp
2

    (5) 
 
The strategic behavior of the firms is analyzed in terms of a two- stage game.  In the first stage, each firm 
decides its own R&D level.  In the second stage, given the R&D levels, each firm chooses their prices.  Two types 
of strategic R&D decisions are considered.  First, we consider a non-cooperative (strategic) R&D decision where 
                                                 
2 Note that 0>=  implies that the goods are homogeneous.  As it has been pointed out in Singh and Vives for  =  the demand 
system may not be well defined. 
3 The underlying utility function that generates this demand structure is similar to the one suggested by Dixit (1979).  It is assumed that in the 
economy there is a monopolistic sector with two firms producing differentiated goods x1 and x2 (with prices p1 p2) and a competitive numeraire 
sector whose output is m.  The utility function of the representative consumer is separable and linear in m.  Thus the demand structure of (1) 
arises out of the utility function:                 
 
 
     
               . 
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each firm independently decides its own R&D level in the first stage of the game.  We also consider a cooperative 
(strategic) R&D decision where the firms cooperate in their R&D decision stage to maximize their joint profit. 
 
In the non-cooperative game, using the relevant first order conditions we first determine the equilibrium 
pricing strategy for given R&D levels, y and y
21
: 
 
B
i i j
1
 = [K -b(2b +c )  - b(2b +c) ]   i, j = 1,2   i jy yp   

 
 
where:
2 2     = 4  -  > 0      and  K = (a +bA)(2b +c)b c  (6) 
 
Substituting the pricing strategy of (6) in (5), the profits at the preceding stage can be determined to be: 
 
2
2* 2 2 2 2 i
i i j2
yb
 =    (K - ) + (2 - -bc )  + (2 -bc - )    - y yb c b c
2

      
         i, j = 1,2    i  j     (7) 
 
Maximizing the profit level by choosing y1 and y2 we calculate the equilibrium non-cooperative R&D and 
price levels as: 
 
*
2 2
B
i 2
2 2 2 2
(K - )(2 -  - bc )b c
 =        i = 1,2y
 - (2 - - bc )(2 - - bc)(1+ )b c b c
2b
 
 
  
 
 (8) 
 
*
2 2 2
B
i 2
2 2 2 2
1 (K A )(2 +bc)(2 bc )(1+ )b b c
 = K       i = 1,2p
(2 bc )(2 bc)(1+ )b c b c
2b
 
 
      
   
        
  
 (9) 
  
As for the cooperative R&D agreements, in the first stage of the game the firms choose the R&D levels so 
that the joint profit, 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  is maximized.  The equilibrium cooperative R&D and price levels can thus be 
found to be: 
 
2 2
B
i 2
2 22 2
(K - )(2 - bc - )(1+ )b cˆ  =    i = 1,2y
- (2 - bc - (1+) )b c
2b
 
 
 
 
 (10) 
 
22 2 2
i 2
2 22 2
1 (K A )(2 +bc)(2 bc )(1+ )b b cˆ  = K        i = 1,2p
(2 bc (1+) )b c
2b

 
 
     
   
     
  
 (11) 
 
The levels of R&D, price, and output for the non-cooperative and cooperative agreements can now be 
compared.  Theorem 1 summarizes the results. 
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Theorem 1: 
 
(i) If the goods are either complementary or independent, the R&D levels under cooperative agreements 
exceed those under non-cooperation, regardless of the extent of R&D spillover; if the goods are substitutes then 
even for sufficiently small spillover, the cooperative R&D levels may exceed the non-cooperative R&D levels 
provided 
2 2
bc
>
2b c


; (ii) under the same conditions as in (i) the prices under cooperation are less than those 
under non cooperation; (iii) under the same conditions as in (i) the output levels under cooperation exceed those 
under non- cooperation. 
 
Proof: 
 
(i) From (8) and (10) 
 
*B B
ii
ˆ  > ,    i = 1,2yy  
 
if 
2 2 2 2(2 -bc - )(1+ ) > (2 - -bc )b c b c   
 
or, if 
2 2
bc
 > 
2 -b c
  
 
The assertions follow immediately by noting that 0  c=
<
>
 according as the goods are complementary, 
independent or substitutes .|c>|b and  
 
(ii) Follows from the proof of (i) and direct comparison of (9) and (11). 
 
(iii) Using the proof of (ii) and noting the symmetry of (9) and (11) we can determine the output levels under 
non-cooperation and cooperative arrangements as 
 
** BB
i i = a - (b - c)     i = 1,2px  (12) 
 
BB
i i
ˆ = a - (b - c)    i = 1,2ˆ px  (13) 
 
The assertion in (iii) follows from direct comparison of (12) and (13). 
 
3. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this section we discuss the welfare implications of the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D 
arrangements.  For the welfare analysis, following Singh and Vives and D'aspremont and Jacquemin, we define 
social welfare W as the sum of total producer surplus and consumer surplus.  Since all the equilibria that have been 
determined so far are symmetric. 
 
i ji j i j
 =  = p,   =  = x,   =  = y   i, j = 1,2, i jy yp p x x   
 
Consequently the social welfare function can be written as: 
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22w = 2( A)x  ( + )  + 2(1+ )xy  yx        (14) 
 
The efficient individual R&D and output can be calculated as: 
 
**
2
( - A)(1+ )
 = y
( + ) - (1+ )
 
   
 (15) 
 
 ** 2
1 ( A)
 = ( A) (1 )y * *x
( ) ( + ) (1+ )
  
     
       
 (16) 
 
The corresponding efficient price level 
**p
 is determined to be 
 
2
**
2
( - A)(1+ )
 = A - p
( + ) - (1+ )
  
 
      (17) 
 
The efficient levels of R&D, output and price obtained above provide the benchmarks for evaluating 
efficiency of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D arrangements. Theorem 2 shows that when measured against 
these benchmarks, cooperative R&D agreements, although not socially efficient, turn out to be relatively more 
efficient than non-cooperative R&D. 
 
Theorem 2: 
 
(i) x>x>x(ii)  ,y > y > y B
B**BB** *
*
ˆˆ , and (iii) .p < p < p
BB**
*
ˆ  The first set of inequalities in (i), (ii), 
and (iii) holds for any degree of R&D spillover regardless whether the goods are substitutes, complementary or 
independent while the second set of inequalities holds for any degree of R&D spillover if the goods are either 
complementary or independent and even for sufficiently small spillover with 
2 2
bc
 > 
2 -b c
  (or, equivalently, 
2
>
2


 
   
) in the case of substitute goods. 
 
Proof:  
 
(i) The cooperative Bertrand R&D level in (10) can be simplified to be: 
 
2
2
( )(1+ )
ˆ  = y
(2 ( + ))
  (1+ )
2 ( )
    
    
  
   
 (18) 
 
Comparing (18) with (15) one can conclude that: 
 
B** ˆ > y y  
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if 
2 2
( -  +  > 0)    
 
which is true for any value of   and independent of  . Also, by Theorem 1, 
*B Bˆ  > yy  for any degree of R&D 
spillover if the goods are complementary or independent and even for sufficiently small spillover with 
c
2 2
b
>
2 -b c
  or equivalently with 
2
>
2 -


 
  
. 
 
(ii) Note that using (10) and (11), the cooperative output can be expressed as: 
 
BB ˆ = ( - A) + (1+ )yxˆ
( + )(2 )

       
 (19) 
 
In view of (15), (16) and (i) above, 
B** >  ˆx x  
 
if ( ) > 0    
 
which is true for any value of   and independent of  . Also, by Theorem 1, under the conditions specified in (i) 
*B B > ˆ xx . 
 
(iii) Follows from (9), (11), (17), (ii) above, and Theorem 1. 
 
In Japan and Europe firms for long have enjoyed a relaxed treatment of collaborative R&D ventures.  
Recently, also in the U.S. a number of public policy measures have been taken to encourage firms to undertake 
cooperative R&D ventures.  The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 is one such policy measure. In view of 
Theorem 2 one can now make a case for encouraging cooperative R&D ventures.  The result is summarized in 
Theorem 3. 
 
Theorem 3: 
 
In terms of social welfare (measured as the sum of consumer's surplus and producer's surplus) cooperative 
R&D agreements dominate the respective non-cooperative R&D ventures when the goods are either complements or 
independent.  For substitute goods the same result holds even for sufficiently small R&D spillover with: 
 
2
>
2


 
  
 
 
 
Proof: 
 
Follows from Theorem 2 and the social welfare function in (14). 
 
It may seem counter-intuitive that the collusive R&D agreements between firms may lead to more 
favorable levels of R&D, output, price, and finally final social welfare, as compared with non-cooperative, purely 
competitive R&D decisions, but the benefits of cooperative R&D decisions result from R&D spillovers, which act 
as positive externalities and lower costs of other firms.  Cooperative R&D agreements help internalize these 
externalities and thus increase the levels of R&D, output and social welfare. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have examined the implications of cooperative R&D agreements in presence of product 
differentiation using a Bertrand duopoly model. The R&D and price decisions are analyzed using a two-stage game.  
It has been shown that under cooperative R&D agreements R&D and output levels are larger and prices are lower 
than under non-cooperation.  For complementary and independent goods these results are valid for any degree of 
R&D spillover and may hold even for sufficiently small R&D spillover with substitute goods.  These results are 
more general than D'Aspremont and Jacquemin who have shown that for a Cournot duopoly producing a 
homogeneous good, cooperative R&D levels exceeds those under non-cooperation only for large R&D spillover.  
These results also suggest that cooperation for developmental research that tends to have lower R&D spillover than 
basic research can also lead to increased R&D efforts. 
 
As for social welfare, the cooperative as well as the non-cooperative R&D, output and price levels have 
been found to be socially inefficient.  However, cooperative R&D agreements tend to dominate non-cooperative 
R&D ventures in terms of social welfare.  The result holds for any degree of R&D spillover for complementary and 
independent goods and even for sufficiently small spillover in the case of substitute goods. 
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